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PROPERTY LAW
I.

NUISANCE EXCEPTION TO TAKINGS DOCTRINE STRETCHED PAST
TRADITIONAL LIMITS

In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council' the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that an application of the South Carolina Beach-

front Management Act (the Act)2 which precluded the owner of two

vacant beachfront lots from building a single-family residence on either lot did not constitute a taking of private property without just
compensation. The majority3 opinion characterized the Act as a regula'4
tion on the use of property "necessary to prevent a great public harm"
and therefore concluded that no regulatory taking had occurred even
though the Act's application deprived the landowner of all economically viable use of the lots. 5
In 1986 David Lucas purchased two vacant oceanfront lots in the
Wild Dunes development located on the Isle of Palms in Charleston
County, South Carolina.' Lucas planned to build a single-family dwelling on each lot.7 In 1988 the South Carolina legislature passed the
Beachfront Management Act, which limited construction on lands adjoining the Atlantic Ocean." As applied, the Act prohibited Lucas from

1. 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Nov. 18,
1991) (No. 91-453).
2. 1988 S.C. Acts 634 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10, -130, 270 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988)) (amended 1990).
3. The court split three to two in reaching its decision. Justice Toal wrote the
majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Gregory and Justice Finney. Justice Harwell
wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Chandler concurred.
4. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898. The court relied in great part on legislative findings.
Because the property owner did not challenge the findings, the court refused to question
them. Id.
5. Id. at 899, 901.
6. Id. at 895.
7. Id. at 907 (Harwell, J., dissenting).
8. The Act establishes two lines that largely define the scope of the Act's coverage. First, the Act authorizes the use of scientific and historical data to create a "baseline" that parallels South Carolina's shoreline. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(A) (Law. Coop. Supp. 1988) (amended 1990). Second, the Act creates a "setback line," which is located landward of the baseline "at a distance which is forty times the average annual
erosion rate," but "no less than twenty feet landward of the baseline." Id. § 48-39280(B)(1). The area between the setback line and the mean high-water mark of the Atlantic Ocean is the "beach/dune system." Id. § 48-39-270(5). The Act heavily regulates
construction in this area. See id. §§ 48-39-290, -300.
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building permanent structures on either lot, except for a small deck or
walkway.0
After the South Carolina Coastal Council (the Council) denied Lucas's applications for building permits, 10 he filed an action in the
Charleston County Court of Common Pleas. Lucas argued that the use
restrictions constituted a taking of his property without just compensation. Lucas presented evidence that "the Act's prohibition against the
erection of any habitable structure caused the value of the lots to
plummet to zero."" Lucas asked for monetary relief. The trial court
held that a taking had occurred and awarded Lucas
$1,232,387.50 as
12
just compensation. The supreme court reversed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court began its analysis of the constitutional issue' s presented by observing that the United States Supreme Court has never established a brightline test for deciding
"'where regulation ends and taking begins.' 14 The Lucas court noted,
however, that the United States Supreme Court has articulated various
factors to aide in determining when a regulation rises to the level of a
taking. 5 The factors, as recognized by the Lucas court, include: "(1)
the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the regulation's interference
with investment backed expectations; (3) the character of the government action (whether there is a physical invasion); and (4) the nature
of the State's interest in the regulation."' 6
Noting that "[o]ne or more but fewer than all of these factors may
be critical and determinative in a given case,' 7 the Lucas court found
the fourth factor, the nature of the state's interest in the regulation,
dispositive. The court quoted the General Assembly's declaration of
the "findings" and "policy" that underlie the Act'8 and noted that Lu-

9. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 896.
10. The Council is the state agency charged with administering the Act. S.C. CoDE
ANN. § 48-39-50 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
11. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 907 (Harwell, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 896.
13. Takings jurisprudence is grounded in the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. See U.S.
CONsT. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause extends this prohibition to the states. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). The South
Carolina Constitution also bars the taking of private property without just compensation. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
14. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898 (quoting Moore v. Sumter County Council, 300 S.C.
270, 272 n.2, 387 S.E.2d 455, 457 n.2 (1990)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 899 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 495 (1987)).

17. Id.
18. Id. at 896-98 (quoting 1988 S.C. Acts 634 §§ 1, 2 (codified as S.C. CODE ANN. §§
48-39-250, -260 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990))). For an explanation of the somewhat confus-
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cas conceded the validity of these pronouncements. 19 The court summarized the effect of this concession on Lucas's claim:
By failing to contest these legislative findings, Lucas concedes that
the beach/dune area of South Carolina's shores is an extremely valuable public resource; that the erection of new construction, inter alia,
contributes to the erosion and destruction of this public resource; and
that discouraging new construction in close proximity to the beach!
dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm. This Court is
likewise bound by these uncontested legislative findings.20
Consequently, the court characterized the issue as "whether governmental regulation of the use of property, in order to prevent serious
public harm, amounts to a 'regulatory taking' 21 of property for which
compensation must be paid."2 2 Relying on Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis,23 the' court stated that a "'prohibition
simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking.' ",24 The
court labeled this doctrine the "Mugler rule."25 Applying this rule, the

court concluded that because the Beachfront Management Act "prevented a use seriously harming the public . . . no regulatory taking

ing procedural history of these two sections, see id. at 896 n.2.
19. Id. at 896.
20. Id. at 898.
21. A regulatory taking differs from a situation in which the government physically
takes possession of property under its eminent domain powers. In the latter situation
courts uniformly hold that the takings clause requires the payment of just compensation.
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 (1964). In a regulatory takings
context the government does not physically take possession of the property, but rather
restricts the use of the property to such a degree that the owner argues that the government has effectively taken the property. Courts are not uniform in determining when
regulations become so onerous as to require compensation. In the opinion of one legal
scholar, "[b]y far the most intractable constitutional property issue is whether certain
governmental actions 'take' property without satisfying the constitutional requirements
of due process and just compensation." Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings
Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. Rav. 561, 561 (1984) (footnote omitted).
22. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 896 (footnote added).
23. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
24. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 900 (quoting Keystone, 480 U.S. at 489 (quoting Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887))).
25. Id. at 901. The Court first recognized the doctrine in Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887). The theory behind the Mugler rule is "'that since no individual has a
right-to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State
has not "taken" anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity.'"
Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899 (quoting Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 n.20). This legal principle
also has been labeled the "nuisance exception." Id. at 901 n.5 (referring to Keystone, 480
U.S. at 512 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
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ha[d] occurred." 26
Although the legal principles underlying the Mugler rule are well
established, 27 the Lucas court's reliance on Mugler and its progeny 28
seems misplaced. Indeed, the ramifications of Lucas go beyond those of
the Mugler line of cases, which address the government's attempt to
abate public nuisances.2 9
It is well settled that the government can prohibit a public nuisance without incurring any obligation to compensate the proprietor.2 0
Therefore, it becomes important to define nuisance. Unfortunately, the
parameters of nuisance are incapable of precise determination. 31 No
brightline test exists for determining what uses are a nuisance. An
analysis of the decisions relied upon32 by the Lucas court discloses, however, two main classes of nuisance.
One class includes situations in which owners intentionally devote
their property to uses directly antagonistic to the health, morals, or
safety of the public.3 3 Building a home on one's property is not directly
hostile to the health, safety, or morals of the people of South Carolina.
Therefore, Mr. Lucas's intended use of his property should not fall
within the first class of nuisance. The second class includes situations
in which an accepted activity becomes unacceptable merely because it
is inappropriate or hazardous in a particular setting.3 4 Lucas's pro-

26.
27.
28.
U.S. 272

Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899.
See id. at 901.
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276
(1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).

29. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491.
30. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
31. In Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), the United States Supreme Court
upheld the state-ordered destruction of a property owner's red cedar trees infected with
a disease that threatened nearby apple orchards. The Court concluded that it "need not
weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars constitute a nuisance according to the common law" because the impending danger of the spread of the disease to
the apple orchards made the state's decision "unavoidable." Id. at 280.
32. Comment, Houses on the Sand: Taking Issues SurroundingStatutory Restrictions on the Use of Ocean FrontProperty, 18 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 125, 140 (1990).
33. Id.; see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding state legislation that
prohibited the manufacture of alcoholic beverages); Richards v. City of Columbia, 227
S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955) (upholding ordinance that mandated the repair, alteration, or closing of dwellings unfit for habitation); Arnold v. City of Spartanburg, 201 S.C.
523, 23 S.E.2d 735 (1943) (upholding a statutory prohibition on the Sunday sale of intoxicating liquors).
34. Comment, supra note 32, at 141. This situation often occurs when residential
neighborhoods emerge around previously existing industrial areas. See Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding town ordinance that regulated
dredging and pit excavation within city limits); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915) (upholding municipal ordinance that prohibited the operation of a brickyard
within a residential neighborhood).
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posed action also does not fall within this class of nuisance.
Although it seems reasonable to argue that the presence of a residence in critical areas of the "beach/dune system" falls within the second type of nuisance, this assertion breaks down upon closer examination. The hazardous effects to the public safety and welfare that arise
from permanent structures located in critical areas of the "beach/dune
system" are relatively insignificant. 35 Assertions that the Act's prohibitions are necessary to protect the public against the dangers of hurricanes and other tropical storms36 are not persuasive. Current weather
forecasting technology provides adequate time to allow evacuation. In
addition, property damage can be minimized by establishing building
code standards that are sufficient to enable permanent structures to
withstand hurricane forces.
Proponents of a law may be tempted to define nuisance as any use
of property that violates a state statute that is supported by a legitimate public purpose. However, such an interpretation renders meaningless the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause. Governments can almost always articulate some legitimate
public purpose to support the broad exercise of police powers. Under
this interpretation an owner would never be entitled to compensation,
no matter how egregious the economic impact, as37 long as the legislature acted to further a legitimate public purpose.
Accordingly, the appropriateness of the South Carolina Supreme
Court's reliance on the nuisance exception 38 in determining that no

35. The potential dangers presented in Lucas are not comparable to the potential
dangers addressed in Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 595 (attractiveness of water-filled gravel
quarry to children), or Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 408 (sickness and discomfort caused by
noxious fumes and pollution emitted by a brickyard). Moreover, "the Act's gradual fortyyear retreat scheme, rather than immediate destruction of all offending structures, is
clear proof that [beachfront] residences are not dire threats to public safety and welfare." Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165, 173 n.2 (4th Cir. 1991)
(Hall, J., dissenting).
36. See 1988 S.C. Acts 634 §§ 1(1)(a), 2(1)(a) (codified as S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39250, -260 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990)).
37. See Comment, supra note 32, at 140. This interpretation also would contradict
United States Supreme Court precedent. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), the Court noted that it had previously "held that
land use regulation can effect a taking if it 'does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests, . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.'" Id. at 485
(quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). Chief Justice Rehnquist has
stated that "[t]he nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not coterminous with the
police power itself." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 145
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. Because Lucas did not challenge the Act's legislative findings that new construction would cause serious public harm, the court held that Lucas conceded "that the
Mugler 'nuisance-like exception' applies." Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 900.
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taking occurred in Lucas is debatable. This is not to suggest that the
court should have found a taking, but only that the issue demanded
further analysis. The court should have considered the economic im39
pact of the Act on Lucas.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's holding in Lucas marks a
significant break with prior cases that involve takings issues. Those
cases usually required the existence of a situation similar to a public
nuisance before the court would ignore the economic impact of the
challenged legislation. The practitioner that contemplates a regulatory
takings challenge should be aware that Lucas holds that the economic
impact of legislation is irrelevant as long as the legislation prohibits
uses which threaten "serious public harm." Even though some will hail
Lucas as a victory for the state in its efforts to protect and restore
South Carolina's beaches, the decision will certainly have a deleterious
impact on the rights of private property owners.
C. Dan Wyatt, III
II.

PRIVATELY CONSTRUCTED CANAL CONNECTED TO A RIVER MAY BE
NAVIGABLE WATERS

In Hughes v. Nelson 0 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that a privately constructed canal connected to a river may be navigable waters. Consequently, the owner of the land surrounding the canal
may not obstruct public access to the canal. This holding is consistent
with South Carolina case law and reaffirms this state's long-standing
policy of broadly interpreting what constitutes navigable waters.41
39. A distinction can be drawn between cases in which government acts to abate a
nuisance and cases in which government prohibits generally acceptable uses of property
in order to enhance the public health and welfare. See Comment, supra note 32, at 142.
Lucas falls in the enhancement category and the court therefore should have weighed
the economic impact of the Act and the Act's interference with investment backed expectations in its analysis. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
40. 399 S.E.2d 24 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
41. The scope of this Article is limited to a discussion of what constitutes navigable
waters in South Carolina. It should be noted, however, that the Commerce Clause, U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants to the United States Congress the ultimate authority over
navigable waters. See Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 632 (1900) ("The power of
Congress to regulate such waters is ... incidental to the express 'power to regulate commerce ... .' "). The South Carolina Supreme Court has stated that the requirements for
waters to be considered navigable under federal law are different from the requirements
under state law. See State ex rel. Medlock v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 289 S.C.
445, 449, 346 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1986) ("In order to be navigable under the United States,
the water must connect with other water highways so as to subject them to the laws of
interstate commerce."). This distinction permits a state to control the waters within its
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In 1972 Lindberg Hughes dug a canal across his property to the
Edisto River. Construction of the canal was a major undertaking. The
canal extended approximately seventeen hundred feet away from the
river. Its depth ranged from twelve to twenty feet and its width from
fifteen to thirty feet. Although a few times a year lack of water made
access to the canal difficult, normally a problem did not exist. The canal proved to be very good for fishing.42
Hughes sold the property adjacent to the canal. In the sale agreement Hughes expressly reserved the right to use the canal. Over the
years he and others made sporadic attempts to prevent the public from
fishing in the canal. These attempts included the placement of a gate
across the canal's mouth, the stringing of wire across the canal's
mouth, and the placement of "No Trespassing" signs. Eventually,
Anthony Nelson became the owner of the property surrounding the canal. He attempted to thwart even Hughes's use of the canal. Hughes
then brought suit against Nelson.4"
Hughes alleged that the canal constituted navigable waters and
that Nelson's attempts to block access to the canal were unlawful. The
circuit court agreed with Hughes, ordered Nelson to remove all obstructions from the canal, and enjoined Nelson from further blocking
4
access to the canal. Nelson appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. 4
The Hughes court began its analysis by stating that without question "the unauthorized obstruction of navigable waters is unlawful.""
The court noted that Nelson did not dispute that he had obstructed
the canal.4 6 Accordingly, the only issue before the Hughes court was
"whether the waters of the canal are navigable waters, making the cahand, the canal is prinal a public highway, or whether, on the other
47
vate property, like a privately owned road.'
In reaching its decision, the Hughes court applied a test first articulated by the South Carolina Supreme Court nearly a century ago in
Heyward v. Farmers' Mining Co.4" The Hughes court stated that to

borders using criteria other than those established by the United States Supreme Court.
When federal interests are at stake, however, federal law controls. Wald, Navigability Its Meaning and Application in South Carolina, Water Resources Research Project, 23
S.C.L. REV. 28, 29 (1971).
42. Hughes, 399 S.E.2d at 25.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 24.
45. Id. Article XIV, section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution states, "All navi-

gable waters shall forever remain public highways free to the citizens of the State and
the United States.. . ." S.C. CONsT. art. XIV, § 4, quoted in Hughes, 399 S.E.2d at 24.
46. Hughes, 399 S.E.2d at 24.
47. Id. at 25.
48. 42 S.C. 138, 19 S.E. 963 (1894), cited with approval in State ex rel. Medlock v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 289 S.C. 445, 449, 346 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1986).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1991

7

South
Carolina
Law Review,
43, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 17
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
REVIEW
[Vol. 43
determine if a waterway is navigable, "'[t]he true test to be applied is
whether a stream inherently and by its nature has the capacity for valuable floatage, irrespective of the fact of actual use or the extent of
such use.' ,,40
In applying this test, the Hughes court initially observed that the
canal's manner of creation, artificial rather than natural, was not controlling. 0 The court concluded that the waters were in fact navigable
because the public had used the canal for more than fifteen years.1
The court further concluded that it was insignificant that the use of
52
"It
the canal was for pleasure and not for commercial activities.
a more valuable floatage than a
would, indeed, be difficult to imagine
'53
fishing boat on the Edisto River.
Nelson argued that the canal was not navigable waters because (1)
the canal was too shallow at certain times of the year to sustain boat
traffic, (2) a permit administrator employed by the South Carolina
Water Resources Commission told him that a man-made channel must
be at least twenty years old to be considered navigable waters, and (3)
the canal was private property.5 The Hughes court quickly disposed of
these arguments. Responding to Nelson's first argument, the court55
noted that navigability does not require accessibility at all times.
Rather, the test of navigability "is whether [the waterway] is accessible
'at the ordinary stage of the water.' -56 During the majority of the year
the canal is accessible by water.
The court addressed the permit administrator's twenty-year rule
by stating that "[n]o such limitation exists, as a matter of law, on the

49. Hughes, 399 S.E.2d at 25 (quoting Medlock, 289 S.C. at 449, 346 S.E. at 719).
Although not mentioned by the Hughes court, the General Assembly has declared what
constitutes navigable waters. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-1-10 (Law. Co-op. 1987). This section provides:
All streams which have been rendered or can be rendered capable of being
navigated by rafts of lumber or timber by the removal of accidental obstructions and all navigable watercourses and cuts are hereby declared navigable

streams and such streams shall be common highways and forever free, as well
to the inhabitants of this State as to citizens of the United States ....
Id. In Medlock the supreme court explained that this section merely codified the law

established in Heyward. Medlock, 289 S.C. at 449, 346 S.E.2d at 719.
50. Hughes, 399 S.E.2d at 25.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Medlock, 289 S.C. at 450, 346 S.E.2d at 719; Heyward, 42 S.C. at
155, 19 S.E. at 972); see also State ex rel. Lyon v. Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S.C.
181, 189, 63 S.E. 884, 888 (1909) ("Navigable water is a public highway which the public
is entitled to use for the purposes of travel either for business or pleasure.").

53.
54.
55.
56.

Hughes, 399 S.E.2d at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. (quoting Lyon, 82 S.C. at 189, 63 S.E. at 888).
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constitutional and common law right of the public to the unobstructed
use of waters which are, in fact, navigable. 57 The court also rejected
Nelson's private property argument. Nelson supported this argument
with an opinion by the South Carolina Attorney General which states
that "'a canal built entirely on private property, with private funds
and for private purposes, is a private thing, for the same reasons that a
road built on private property for private purposes is a privately owned
road.' "58 Underlying the Attorney General's opinion, however, is the
assumption that "the public had been 'continuously and consistently
excluded'" from using the canal. 59 The Hughes court concluded that
the opinion was inapplicable to the instant case because the public had
not been "continuously and consistently excluded" from using the
canal.6 0
Whether a canal that connects to a river may constitute navigable
waters when the public is continuously denied access to the canal remains an open question. The answer depends on the courts' acceptance
of the Attorney General's opinion. If the courts accept the opinion,8
the question becomes how to define the scope of a "continuous and
consistent" exclusion.6 2 Hughes establishes, however, that sporadic attempts over a fifteen-year period to deny access to the public are
insufficient.
William G. Lyles, III
HI. SCOPE OF MODIFICATION PROVISIONS IN RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
DEFINED

In Erkes v. Kasparek63 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that an amendment to a subdivision's restrictive covenants, which im-

57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting 1986 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 86-99, at 304).
59. Id. at 26 (quoting 1986 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 86-99, at 303). The Attorney

General's opinion cited Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp., 444 U.S. 206 (1979) (per curiam), as
support for this proposition. In Vaughn the United States Supreme Court held that a
privately constructed canal system is not a navigable waterway. Id. at 208-09. In Vaughn
the owner of the land surrounding the canals posted over 400 "No Trespassing" signs
and employed individuals to patrol the canals. Id. at 207. On numerous occasions these
employees prevented strangers from entering the canals. Id.
60. Hughes, 399 S.E.2d at 26.
61. The Hughes court reacted to the Attorney General's opinion by "[a]ssuming,
without deciding, that the opinion is correct." Id.
62. The Attorney General decided that this issue was a question of fact. See 1986
Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 86-99, at 304.
63. 399 S.E.2d 6 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, No. 1541, Advance
Sheet 3 (S.C. Feb. 9, 1991).
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posed a minimum size for future lots, was null and void. The facts
which the court found determinative were that the residents who attempted to implement the amendment did not have authority over the
unsold property in the subdivision, the developers of the property reserved the right to subdivide the remaining property at their own discretion, and the residents were adding new restrictions rather than
amending or changing the existing restrictions.'
Appellants George R. Erkes and James D. Quinn (the Developers)
purchased a 176 acre tract of land in York County, South Carolina in
1952. In 1955 the Developers began to sell individual lots subject to
restrictive covenants, which they had placed on the use and development of the land. The instrument that imposed the restrictive covenants on the subdivision provided that "any of the conditions, restrictions, and covenants herein contained may be changed, or amended in
any manner by the mutual consent in writing of 51% of the owners of
all lots in the development." 5
Pursuant to this provision, the Developers amended the restrictive
covenants twice. In 1960 the Developers raised the minimum cost allowed for homes in the subdivision, and three years later they changed
the minimum requirements for setback lines. In 1987 the residents of
the subdivision tried to amend the restrictive covenants. They drafted
several amendments, one of which established a minimum lot size. The
Developers objected to the amendment that established a minimum lot
size and began legal proceedings to nullify it.66
The matter was referred to a special referee who recommended
that the amendment be canceled. The circuit court rejected the referee's recommendation and found that the residents' amendment was
valid. The Developers appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals
and sought a7 declaratory judgement that would nullify the residents'
amendment.

6

The court of appeals ruled in the Developers' favor. The court
gave three reasons for its decision. First, the court stated that the residents did not have the authority to establish a minimum lot size for
the parcels that had not been sold. The court reached this conclusion
by reliance on the proposition that power over the disposition of property can only be granted "by an instrument executed with the same
formalities as would be necessary for the disposition of the property
they purport to restrict."6 8 The court reasoned that because such an

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 7-8.
Brief of Appellants at 2.
Erkes, 399 S.E.2d at 7.
Id.
Id. (citing Home Sales, Inc. v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 299 S.C. 70, 77, 382
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instrument did not exist, the69residents did not have the authority to
establish a minimum lot size.
Second, the court determined that the language of the restrictive
covenants impliedly reserved to the Developers the unrestricted right
to subdivide the remaining land in the tract. The court reasoned that
because, restrictive covenants are contractual in nature, the residents
agreed to the Developers' reservation of rights when they purchased
their lots. Thus, the residents were bound by the reservation and could
not attempt to modify the Developers' rights to subdivide the tract.70
Third, the Erkes court found that the residents did not amend or
change existing restrictive covenants, but instead improperly created a
new covenant. The court determined that the provision of the restrictive covenant that allowed the restrictions to be changed or amended
pertained only to the modification of existing restrictions. The court
found that the language of the covenant proved that the Developers
intended to limit modification of the restrictive covenants to those already in existence. The court then noted that the original restrictions
made no reference to lot sizes. The court concluded, therefore, that the
residents did not have the power to add a new restriction on minimum
lot size.7

1

In holding that the amendment was a newly created restriction
and not a modification, the court of appeals strictly construed the
terms "change" and "amend" in the covenant. The court also considered South Carolina's policy that favors freedom in the owner's use of
property. In light of this policy, even if the Developers' intent had been
less clear, the residents' ability to place additional restrictions on the
72
property would still have been limited.
The Erkes decision conforms to the approach taken by other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue.73 Courts in some other jurisdictions have held, however, that restrictive covenants may be modified to
increase, reduce, or eliminate restrictions. 74 These cases do not directly

S.E.2d 463, 467 (Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam)).
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id.
71. Id.

72. Id. (citing Hamilton v. CCM, Inc., 274 S.C. 152, 157-58, 263 S.E.2d 378, 381
(1980)); Davey v. Artistic Builders, Inc., 263 S.C. 431, 211 S.E.2d 235 (1975).

73. Lakeland Property Owners Ass'n v. Larson, 121 IMI.App. 3d 805, 810, 459
N.E.2d 1164, 1169 (IlM. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that a provision in a restrictive covenant
which specifically stated that residents could change "the said covenants" referred to

existing, but not additional, covenants); Van Deusen v. Ruth, 343 Mo. 1096, 1101, 125
S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (1939) (holding that language in a restrictive covenant that referred to the

"foregoing provisions" applied to the existing provisions and thus precluded any additional restrictions).
74. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Rancho Santa Fe Ass'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 726, 223
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conflict with the Erkes opinion because they hold that existing restrictions may be modified to be more or less restrictive and Erkes holds
that completely new restrictions may not be added to restrictive covenants. Thus, the Erkes decision brings South Carolina in line with
other jurisdictions on this issue.
Dunn D. Hollingsworth

IV.

COURT AVOIDS ENTANGLEMENT IN CHURCH DISPUTE BY HOLDING
PLAINTIFFS LACKED STANDING TO SUE

In Blair v. Blair75 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that
two persons suing as trustees of a minority faction of a divided church
congregation did not have standing to maintain an action to quiet title
to property mortgaged pursuant to a vote of the majority because the
two persons were neither trustees of the minority faction nor beneficiaries of the purported trust containing the property. This holding reflects the well-established rule in South Carolina of judicial deference
76
to ecclesiastical decisions.

Blair involved a dispute among church members over the disposition of church property. In 1952 the pastor of Pearson Welcome Baptist Church (PWBC) and his wife deeded a building and its lot to
Charles Blair, Charles Blair, Jr., William Blair, Richboroug Blanding,
and Limas Nelson as trustees of PWBC. The deed provided that the
named grantees were "'[t]o hold, preserve and control the [property]
for the use and benefit of the membership of the Pearson Welcome
Baptist Church.' "7

In 1983 the majority of the congregation voted to mortgage the
property, use the proceeds to move to a new building, and change the
church's name to Peoples Baptist Church. To facilitate this plan the
majority authorized Charles Blair, Jr. and William Blair to deed the
property to themselves as trustees of Peoples Baptist Church. Charles
Blair, Jr. and William Blair then mortgaged the property and used the
proceeds to buy a new church building.7 8
Meanwhile, a minority of the congregation had resolved to remain
in the old building and to continue under the old name. After Charles
Blair, Jr. and William Blair executed the mortgage, Charles Blair and

Cal. Rptr. 175 (1986); French v. Diamond Hill-Jarvis Civic League, 724 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987).

75.
76.
77.
78.

396 S.E.2d 374 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
Blair, 396 S.E.2d at 375 (quoting deed).
Id. at 376.
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Limas Nelson brought an action as trustees of PWBC79 to quiet title to
the property in themselves and to invalidate the mortgage.8"
The master in equity found that Charles Blair, Jr. and William
Blair, as trustees of Peoples Baptist Church, took title to the property
by means of the 1983 deed to themselves. The mortgage, therefore, was
valid. The circuit court affirmed the master's determination. The court
of appeals affirmed, but on the ground that both plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue.81
The court of appeals found that neither Charles Blair nor Limas
Nelson were trustees of PWBC.8 2 The court affirmed the master's finding that Charles Blair was a deacon, and not a trustee, of PWBC.8 3 The
court also affirmed the master's finding that Limas Nelson ceased to be
a member of PWBC more than twenty years prior to the commencement of the suit."4 Therefore, he was not a trustee.
The court further held that neither Charles Blair nor Limas Nelson were beneficiaries of the trust created by the 1952 deed. The court
noted that the 1952 deed conveyed the property "for the 'benefit of the
membership of the Pearson Welcome Baptist Church.'"85 The court
first concluded that Limas Nelson could not possibly be a beneficiary
of the trust because he had not been a member of PWBC for more
than two decades.8 " The court applied similar reasoning to Charles
Blair. The court stated:
Because the action of Pearson Welcome Baptist Church in changing its name to Peoples Baptist Church was valid, the congregation of
Pearson Welcome Baptist Church became the congregation of Peoples
Baptist Church. It cannot be gainsaid that Charles Blair or any member of the minority faction of the split congregation continued to be a
member
of the congregation intended to be benefitted by the 1952
7
deed.

Thus, Charles Blair, like Limas Nelson, lacked standing to enforce any
rights created by the 1952 deed. 8
The Blair court's analysis adheres to the well-established principle

79. Id. at 374.
80. Id. at 376.
81. Id.
82. The court noted that "Charles Blair and Limas Nelson sue[d] as trustees [and]
not as members or representatives of the membership of Pearson Welcome Baptist
Church." Id.'at 376 n.3.
83. Id. at 376.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 377 (quoting deed).
86. Id.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 378.
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that ecclesiastical decisions are not subject to judicial review absent
fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness. 9 In Turbeville v. Morris9 ° the South
Carolina Supreme Court stated, "[Iln South Carolina the Courts of law
in considering a civil right which is dependent upon an ecclesiastical
matter will accept as final the decision of a legally constituted ecclesiastical tribunal having jurisdiction of the matter." 9' The Blair court
found "that the actions of Pearson Welcome Baptist Church in changing its name, moving to a new location, transferring the property, and
mortgaging it were valid and consistent with Baptist church policy. '92
Thus, the court properly refused to intervene.
Lisa M. Woodbury

V.

INTERSTATE BOUNDARY DISPUTE BETWEEN SOUTH CAROLINA AND
GEORGIA RESOLVED

In Georgia v. South Carolina5 the United States Supreme Court
resolved an interstate boundary dispute that involved an area along
the Savannah River which extended from just northwest of the city of
Savannah downstream into the Atlantic Ocean. The decision fixed the
boundary between the two states and provided an illustrated mechanism for determining when the evolution of the Savannah River alters
this boundary.
In 1732 the King of England issued a charter for the Colony of
Georgia."4 The Charter described the boundary between the Colony of
Georgia and the Colony of South Carolina as "the most northern part
of a stream or river there, commonly called the Savannah. ' '95 In February 1787 Georgia imposed a tax on all ships entering the port of Savannah.9 s This event and the continuing dispute concerning the precise
location of the boundary precipitated a meeting in Beaufort, South

89. Id. at 377 (citing Hatcher v. South Carolina Dist. Council of the Assemblies of
God, Inc., 267 S.C. 107, 226 S.E.2d 253 (1976)); cf. Turbeville v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287,
315, 26 S.E.2d 821, 832 (1943) ("These matters present questions of a purely ecclesiastical nature.
....
The Courts of South Carolina will not go behind the decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals on questions of this nature, by making the slightest inquiry into their
wisdom.").
90. 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943).
91. Id. at 306, 26 S.E.2d at 828.
92. Blair, 396 S.E.2d at 377.
93. 110 S. Ct. 2903 (1990).
94. Id. at 2907.

95. Id.
96. First Report of the Special Master 7 (1985) [hereinafter 1 Rep.].
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Carolina of representatives from each state.97 These discussions pro-

duced the Treaty of Beaufort, which was signed on April 28, 1787 and
subsequently ratified by each state's legislature and by the Continental
Congress.9"
The Treaty's first article established the boundary between the
states as "'[the most northern branch or stream of the river Savannah
. . .reserving all the islands in the said river[] Savannah.

.

.to Geor-

gia.' ,,9The first article stated that this would be the boundary "'forever hereafter.'

"10

The Treaty's second article secured to citizens of

both states the right to traverse the principal stream free from tolls or
other hindrances "'attempted to be enforced by one State on the citizens of the other.'

",0o'

The Treaty of Beaufort, along with interpretive guidelines that
were enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 1922,102 provided the legal framework for resolving the most recent boundary dispute between Georgia and South Carolina. In 1922 the Court held that
where the Savannah River was free of islands the boundary between
the states runs midway between the banks and where it was not free of
islands the boundary runs midway between the island bank and the
South Carolina bank. 0 3 The Court in 1990 agreed with these guidelines, but concluded that they referred to the islands as they existed in
1787.104

Although in 1990 the Court recognized that the natural evolution
of the river could alter the banks and thus the boundary,1 5 the Court
rejected Georgia's contention that the emergence of islands in the river
after 1787 worked a similar change. Georgia argued that the provision
in the Treaty's first article "reserving all the islands in the said river[]
Savannah. .. to Georgia" places in Georgia all islands whenever they
emerge. 108 Georgia also argued that each time an island emerges the
boundary shifts to the north to the midline between the new island's
bank and the South Carolina shore. 0 7 The Court rejected this argument and stated that such an interpretation contradicts the provision

97. See Georgia v. South Carolina, 110 S. Ct. at 2907.
98. Id. at 2907-08.
99. Id. at 2908 n.1 (quoting Treaty of Beaufort, Apr. 28, 1787, Georgia-South Carolina, art. 1, 1 S.C. Stat. 411, 413 (1836)).
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting Treaty of Beaufort, Apr. 28, 1787, Georgia-South Carolina, art. 2, 1
S.C. Stat. 411, 413 (1836)).
102. Georgia v. South Carolina, 257 U.S. 516 (1922).
103. Id. at 523.
104. Georgia v. South Carolina, 110 S.Ct. at 2915.
105. Id. at 2916.
106. Id. at 2915.
107. Id.
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in the Treaty's first article that established the boundary "'forever
hereafter.' "1o8 Georgia's solution "would create a regime of continually

shifting jurisdiction,"'0 9 and the Court found that this solution would
not "comport[] with the principles of simplicity and finality that
animated the Court's reading of the Treaty in 1922,. . . [or] with the
respect for settled expectations
that generally attends the drawing of
'' 0
interstate boundaries."
Another point of contention involved the Barnwell Islands area,
which in South Carolina's estimation was "the most valuable land in
the present dispute.""' Georgia did not appeal the Special Master's
recommendation that the Rabbit Island area be declared part of South
Carolina. 11 2 Rather, it argued that the activity of the Army Corps of
Engineers which led to the other three islands joining together and
then joining the South Carolina mainland does not work a similar
change in the boundary. Georgia contended that the boundary should
proceed along the same path it had followed before the activity of the
Corps of Engineers caused this part of the boundary to be surrounded
by land. South Carolina countered by accepting Georgia's rationale,
but argued the state had acquired ownership of the entire area by prescription and acquiescence.
The Court held that the history of the Barnwell Islands, along
with Georgia's "long inaction in the face of [South Carolina's] continuing and obvious exercise of dominion since 1795,"' established South
Carolina's claim by prescription and acquiescence."

4

The Court re-

jected Georgia's argument that the 1955 decision in United States v.
450 Acres of Land" 5 terminated whatever dominion South Carolina
exercised by breaking the continuous possession requirement necessary
to prove prescription." 6 The Court pointed out that South Carolina
was not a party to the suit and that the Court at the time had denied
South Carolina's petitions which requested that the Court resolve the
boundary dispute in the Barnwell Islands area."1
Continuing downstream, the area along the northern bank known
as Southeastern Denwill presented the next problem. The Corps of Engineers erected a training wall in the late nineteenth century that ex-

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

2915-16.
2915.
2916.
2911.

113. Id. at 2913.
114. Id. at 2914.
115. 220 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 826 (1955).
116. Georgia v. South Carolina, 110 S. Ct. at 2913.

117. Id.
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tended from the South Carolina bank. In subsequent years the Corps
dumped dredge material in this location. The area behind the wall
eventually became dry land.
Georgia contended that the artificial extension of the bank does
not alter the boundary. It also argued that the portion of Southeastern
Denwill that crosses the former midpoint between the northern bank
and Elba Island's northern shore belongs to Georgia. n8 South Carolina
responded by conceding that although the initial stimulus was manmade, the changes that led to the emergence of land were primarily
natural and took a considerable time to complete. 19 Such changes,
South Carolina argued, should shift the boundary south to a new midline between the banks.
The Court cited Arkansas v. Tennessee'" for the controlling legal
principles. 2 In that case the Court stated:
It is settled beyond the possibility of dispute that where running
streams are the boundaries between States, the same rule applies as
between private proprietors, namely, that when the bed and channel
are changed by the natural and gradual processes known as erosion
and accretion, the boundary follows the varying course of the stream;
while if the stream from any cause, natural or artificial, suddenly
leaves its old bed and forms a new one, by the process known as an
avulsion, the resulting change of channel works no change of boundary, which remains in the middle of the old channel, although no
water may be flowing
in it, and irrespective of subsequent changes in
12
the new channel.

2

The Court sided with Georgia.' 2s The Court noted the rapidity of
the dredging and other processes and affirmed the Special Master's
conclusion that these changes were 24primarily avulsive and therefore
worked no change in the boundary.

The final points of contention involved the location of the boundary in the river's mouth and how the boundary proceeds into the
ocean. The initial step in resolving this aspect of the controversy required a precise determination of the location of the river's mouth.
Both parties agreed that Tybee Island confines the river's mouth to the
south. The disagreement stemmed from the absence of a reasonably
close land formation north of Tybee.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 2919.
Id.
246 U.S. 158 (1918).
Georgia v. South Carolina, 110 S. Ct. at 2919.
Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. at 173.
Georgia v. South Carolina, 110 S. Ct. at 2919.
Id. at 2920.
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South Carolina contended that the underwater shoal extending
east from the Oyster Bed Island area constitutes the corresponding
functional equivalent of Tybee Island. This shoal also provides the
northern border for the main navigational channel. South Carolina argued that the boundary should be in the middle of this channel. The
Court affirmed the Special Master's recommendation in favor of South
shoal had been
Carolina's position and noted that the12underwater
5
"long recognized as confining the river.

The determination of the river's mouth provided the starting point
for the Court's resolution of the final issue, the location of the lateral
seaward boundary. The complicating factor that led to the dispute involved each state's coastal geography. 126 The states' coasts do not run
at exactly the same angle from due north. Georgia's coast is the more
vertical of the two. "[Llines drawn perpendicularly from each coast
overlap off the coast"' 2 7 rather than paralleling each other. The Special
Master addressed this complication by drawing a line from Hilton
Head's most southern point to Tybee Island's most northern point.
This reference line is an apparent compromise between each state's
coastline. 28 Where the boundary in the river's mouth intersects this
line, it shifts southeasterly and extends into the ocean perpendicular to
that line. 12 9 The Court concluded that the Special Master's recommendation gave "equitable balance" to the competing interests."30
An attempt to give "equitable balance" to the competing state interests appears to animate much of the Court's opinion. This is especially evident in the Court's decision on the impact on the boundary of
islands that emerged in the river after the states signed the Treaty of
Beaufort in 1787. The Treaty of 1787 established the boundary as
"'[t]he most northern branch or stream of the river Savannah.

.

.re-

serving all the islands in the said river[] Savannah. . .to Georgia.' ",31
The Special Master decided this provision reserved to Georgia only
those islands existing in 1787. Georgia argued that the Treaty guaranteed Georgia all islands whether they emerged prior or subsequent to
1787.
The Court concluded that the Treaty did not reserve to Georgia

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 2917.
Id. at 2920.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2922. The Treaty of Beaufort offered no guidance on this issue because it

did not mention the lateral seaward boundary. Id. at 2921.
131. Id. at 2908 n.1 (quoting Treaty of Beaufort, Apr. 28, 1787, Georgia-South Carolina, art. 1, 1 S.C. Stat. 411, 413 (1836)).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss1/17

18

1991]

et al.: Property Law

PROPERTY LAW

islands emerging after 1787." 2 The language of the two documents that
guided the Court's analysis, the Treaty and the Court's 1922 decision,
provided major obstacles to reaching this determination. The Treaty
contains no hint that the reservation clause covers only those islands
then in existence. 133 Moreover, the 1922 decision does not contain any
words of limitation that involve when an island emerged. The Court in
1922 decreed "[t]hat islands in the Chattooga River are reserved to
Georgia as completely as are those in the Savannah or Tugaloo
rivers." 134
The Court refused to interpret the Treaty to its logical end. Instead, it held that the drafters could not have intended that each new
island "would alter the boundary line to a degree that could be dramatically out of proportion to the physical change brought about by
the formation of the island itself.' 3 5 The Court disposed of the 1922
Court's decree by stating that "[n]o issue of after-emerging islands was
even before the Court."'' 36 Thus, the Court held that the decision was
37
not controlling.
It seems equally plausible to suggest that the commissioners from
each state who met in Beaufort in 1787 -chose certain phrases and
omitted others with the understanding that the language chosen would
provide the definitive guide for those interpreting their work. Perhaps
the reservation clause means exactly what logic suggests it means; that
is, "reserving all the islands in the said river[] Savannah. . . to Georgia" means that all islands in the Savannah belong to Georgia. The
commissioners met to fashion a document to control the future, not the
past. The Treaty looked forward and spoke only of "all the islands."
The commissioners easily could have limited this phrase by inserting
"now existing" after it. They did not.
The question then arises: why would the South Carolina commissioners and the Legislature that ratified the Treaty have agreed to such
a concession? "The principal controversy between the Colonies of
Georgia and South Carolina during the pre-1787 days involved the
navigation rights on the Savannah River, with Georgia claiming exclusive navigation rights to the River."" 81 Georgia's claim derived colorable support from its colonial charter, which described the boundary between Georgia and South Carolina as the "most northern part" of the

132. Id. at 2915-16.
133. See id. at 2925 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the South Carolina view
adopted by the Court renders the reservation clause "superfluous").
134. Georgia v. South Carolina, 257 U.S. 516, 523 (1922).
135. Georgia v. South Carolina, 110 S. Ct. at 2916.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2915.
138. 1 Rep., supra note 96, at 5.
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Savannah River. 139 As the interest of South Carolinians in the state's
interior increased, Georgia's claim became more troublesome. 14 0 In
February 1787 Georgia imposed a tax on all ships entering the port of
Savannah.1 4 ' This event, the more general navigation concerns, and the
continuing boundary dispute prompted the Beaufort conference just
two months later. South Carolina may have been willing to concede all
islands in the Savannah whenever formed to Georgia in exchange for
what today is redundant: the right to travel the Savannah "'exempt
from all duties, tolls, hindrance, interruption or molestation whatsoever, attempted to be enforced by one State on the citizens of the
other.' ,141
In article one of the Treaty South Carolina conceded to Georgia all
islands in the Savannah whenever formed in exchange for Georgia's
guarantee in article two of unfettered access for South Carolinians to
the river. The price paid by South Carolina does not seem quite so
high when viewed in its historical context. However, when South Carolina and Georgia adopted the Federal Constitution they granted to
Congress the power "[tlo regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States."'143 The power possessed by Georgia and South Carolina to regulate commerce between the two states was disgorged. 14 4 Thus, only a
few short years after South Carolina entered the Treaty, it lost the
benefit of its bargain. Given these considerations, perhaps the Court's
interpretation is appropriate not because it is faithful to the Treatymakers' intent, but because notions of fundamental fairness militate
against permitting Georgia to enforce the reservation clause to its fullest extent.
Georgia v. South Carolina resolved a longstanding boundary dispute. An interpretation of the Treaty of Beaufort was central to the
Court's analysis. However, notions of fundamental fairness colored
much of the decision and fostered results that a strict reading of the
Treaty might not support. The decision should prevent future disputes
because it fixes the exact location of the boundary in the area around
Savannah and provides a method for determining the boundary
throughout the Savannah River.
Stanley C. Rodgers

139. Georgia v. South Carolina, 110 S. Ct. at 2907.
140. 1 Rep., supra note 96, at 5.
141. Id. at 7.

142. Georgia v. South Carolina, 110 S. Ct. at 2908 n.1 (quoting Treaty of Beaufort,
Apr. 28, 1787, Georgia-South Carolina, art. 2, 1 S.C. Stat. 411, 413 (1836)).
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
144. South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 9-10 (1876).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss1/17

20

